Re: Икономика

Лаик Чет 24 Апр 2008, 10:35

The pain in Spain
Apr 22nd 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Spain's long property boom has come to a painful end

The Spanish economy has been a driving force for economic activity in the euro area for more than a decade, with year-on-year GDP growth exceeding the average rate of expansion in the euro area in every quarter since 1995. The good times are now over. Turmoil in the world's financial markets has coincided with the bursting of Spain's decade-long housing bubble, raising fears of a deeper and more abrupt economic slowdown than previously thought.

Gloom time
The weakness began last year in the housing market—the major driver of the Spanish economy over the last ten years—with a decline in residential building permits of 11% in 2007 (in the fourth quarter alone the number of permits slumped by a disturbing 29% year on year). And the danger signs are now spreading to other sectors of the economy. Price-adjusted retail sales contracted by around 2% year on year in each of the three months to February 2008, while consumer confidence fell back to its lowest level for more than a decade in the first quarter. The manufacturing sector is also taking a hit. According to Eurostat data, year-on-year growth in manufacturing orders has slowed down markedly since the start of 2008, with the European Commission's business confidence survey revealing that sentiment in the services industry in March had fallen to its weakest level since the inception of the survey in 1996 (admittedly a good period for the Spanish economy).

The Economist Intelligence Unit has cut its forecast for Spanish GDP growth to just 1% in both 2008 and in 2009 (previously 1.9% in both years), compared with an annual average rate of expansion of 3.8% in 1998-2007. The Economist magazine poll of major forecasters from April 19th still showed average forecasts of 2.4% for 2008 and 2.1% for 2009. Despite being well below consensus, we still see the risks primarily on the downside, particularly for 2009. The main reason for our pessimism stems from our view that construction and housing booms rarely peter out smoothly.

Unstable foundations
Spain has clearly gone through such a boom over the past ten years. One of the clearest indicators of this has been the rising share of residential investment to GDP, which increased to 9.3% in 2006 and 2007, compared with an average for Spain since the early 1970s of 5.5% and a current average of around 6.5% for industrialised economies. Rising employment in the construction sector has accounted for a substantial share of overall employment growth in recent years, while house prices are estimated to have increased by 190% between 1997 and 2007—only Ireland and the UK have experienced a similar hike in prices among major industrialised countries. At the same time, household liabilities surged from 47% of disposable income at the end of 1997 to 135% at the end of 2007. Although this was backed in part by easier access to borrowing resulting from lower interest rates (a consequence of euro area accession), it has also reflected increased leverage among consumers. That said, further rises are now unlikely given the tightening in credit conditions in response to continued financial market uncertainty.

A return to a more normal level of housing investment would take off some 3 percentage points of GDP, and in order to absorb earlier excess construction, a temporary fall to below the normal level would probably be necessary. The experience of Sweden, where housing investment declined by 71% between the peak in 1990 and the first (not final) trough in 1995, suggests that such adjustments can be dramatic. Apart from the direct effect of weaker construction investment, private consumption would also be affected by a decline in consumer confidence and negative wealth effects. Most estimates suggest that these wealth effects would be weaker than in the UK or the US, not least because conditions for home equity withdrawal in Spain are more stringent. However, the high level of household indebtedness and the extraordinarily high current-account deficit (a measure of savings of the economy as a whole)—which widened to an estimated 9.1% of GDP in 2007—suggests substantial potential for an increase in household savings, which automatically would depress private consumption.

Financial fears
All these strains will be tough on the Spanish economy. The global financial sector crisis has started to contribute to the pain by tightening access to credit, a serious concern for an economy showing signs of excessive leverage. However, the domestic financial sector seems unlikely to be a major source of trouble itself; it is more likely to be the victim of problems created elsewhere in the Spanish economy and internationally. Spanish covered bonds (the principal instrument for banks to finance housing loans) are backed by mortgages, but the banks retain ultimate responsibility for the repayment of the bonds. This means that unlike banks and housing lenders in the US, Spanish institutions had no incentive to sell mortgages to borrowers who could not afford to repay them. Consequently, there is no equivalent to the sub-prime mortgage lending sector in Spain. Spanish banks also have full recourse to all the assets of a defaulting borrower. In the US, banks only have access to the house for which the mortgage was issued, so that borrowers with negative equity have a strong incentive to default.

This firmer incentive structure suggests that the impact on the Spanish financial system will be less dramatic. However, the size of the housing overhang means it will still be a massive hit. Miguel Ángel Fernández Ordóñez, the governor of the Bank of Spain (the Spanish central bank), which has key responsibilities for banking supervision, said in a speech on April 16th that banks have built provisions and buffers "that would enable shocks of an order of magnitude comparable to those experienced at the height of the crisis in the 1990s to be absorbed". Although data suggest that the economy is in a better position to cope with a crisis than was the case in the early 1990s, when growth slowed to 0.9% in 1992 and contracted by 1% in 1993—at that time the public finances were in deficit, unemployment had risen to over 20% and inflation was higher than it is currently—the continued uncertainty in the international financial markets means that the downturn could be just as bad and take much longer to absorb.

Limited manoeuvre
Apart from the scale of the recent housing boom, policy constraints are an important factor that could have a detrimental effect. Although there are downside risks to growth prospects for many euro area countries, the Spanish economy is likely to perform much worse than the euro area as a whole. Monetary policy for the euro area is generally conducted with a view to the euro area in aggregate, and with Spain's economy accounting for just under 12% of euro area GDP, the European Central Bank will not take much action aimed specifically at stimulating the Spanish economy. With Spain being a member of the euro area (and a departure from the club out of the question), a devaluation of the currency to improve competitiveness and boost export demand is also not an option (although the high, and rising, current-account deficit would suggest a serious overvaluation).

The fiscal situation may be brighter, but support would still be limited. The general government budget balance showed a solid surplus of 2.2% of GDP in 2007. However, the surplus has been boosted in recent years by strong economic activity, and a period of slower growth would lead to a much weaker outcome (the downturn in 1992 led to a deterioration in the fiscal balance of 3.3 percentage points in just one year). The government is in the process of approving a fiscal stimulus package worth €10bn (US$16bn), which includes a €400 annual rebate to every taxpayer, and can be expected to boost public infrastructure investment in an effort to sustain activity and employment in the construction sector. With social spending set to rise as the slowdown deepens, the government's budget surplus is likely to evaporate quickly. Although Spain's low level of government debt—an estimated 35.2% of GDP in 2007—suggests ample room for stimulus measures, the restrictions of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, which requires the budget deficit to be kept below 3% of GDP, will put a rein on fiscal expansion.

(Реалност) Пет 25 Апр 2008, 01:17

Вече съвсем не изглежда невероятно, че през 2008г. или дори през 2009г. най-много износ на стоки ще има...Китай.

Лаик Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:19

България е пред изолация в ЕС

След замразяването на еврофондовете се появиха намеци за блокиране на членството

chocho Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:31

ти откъде знаеш какво има в утершният брой ?

Лаик Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:33

chocho написа:ти откъде знаеш какво има в утершният брой ?

Първоначален Капитал е бюлетин на Капитал, който излиза всеки петък и показва съдържанието на вестника в събота. Вие го получавате, защото сте се абонирали от Capital.bg или защото сте кликнали на линка за абонамент при първоначалното известяване за неговото съществуване

Помощ, граждани! Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:34

Лаик написа:България е пред изолация в ЕС

След замразяването на еврофондовете се появиха намеци за блокиране на членството

подкрепям..

Лаик Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:35

Помощ, граждани! написа:
Лаик написа:България е пред изолация в ЕС

След замразяването на еврофондовете се появиха намеци за блокиране на членството

подкрепям..

абе срамота е Twisted Evil

Помощ, граждани! Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:36

все някой трябва да се засрами вече

chocho Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:37

... и възстановяване след като дойде на власт единствената "правилна" партия ... Laughing

Помощ, граждани! Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:39

chocho написа:... и възстановяване след като дойде на власт единствената "правилна" партия ...

тя и сега е на власт, приятелю.. pig

chocho Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:41

... май нещо съм пропуснал у нас...

Помощ, граждани! Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:48

но май не пропускаш да ми приписваш някакви глупости

твоя работа..

Таки Пет 09 Май 2008, 12:48

тя и сега е на власт, приятелю ..

Нека се въздържаме от употребата на дискредитирани обръщения ... Very Happy

Помощ, граждани! Пет 09 Май 2008, 13:09

http://mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=138719&srcpos=1

как ще коментирате тази новина от фронтпейджа

Лаик Пет 09 Май 2008, 13:19

Помощ, граждани! написа:http://mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=138719&srcpos=1

как ще коментирате тази новина от фронтпейджа

има си кой да коментира alien

chocho Пет 09 Май 2008, 13:48

А, защо - само казвам - преди да подкрепиш, помисли на кого един такъв акт би накривил шапката.

nikiforov Пет 09 Май 2008, 20:50

Помощ, граждани! написа:http://mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=138719&srcpos=1

как ще коментирате тази новина от фронтпейджа

питай иван танасов ... Razz

той И това знае ...

Boabab Пет 09 Май 2008, 23:08

И Плугчиева знае как:

Плугчиева засилва контрола върху европарите с високи чиновнически заплати
http://www.mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=138748&srcpos=4

ПП.Наистина това са ненормални хора.

Boabab Пет 09 Май 2008, 23:25

Хайде честито!

http://www.capital.bg/show.php?storyid=493981

(Натали) Съб 10 Май 2008, 00:15

chocho написа: тя и сега е на власт, приятелю..

Админът, защо дремеш! Веднага банни Чочо за употреба на нецензурни и мръсни думи. Embarassed

Лаик Чет 23 Окт 2008, 10:10

Bubbles and career risk
Oct 21st 2008
From Economist.com

The dangers of left-brained bank bosses

http://www.economist.com/daily/columns/businessview/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12453382&fsrc=nwl

chocho Нед 26 Окт 2008, 18:01

Във връзка със статията, посочена от лаик, ето и едно интересно четиво от последните дни:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Greenspan concedes error on regulation

By Michael M. Grynbaum Published: October 23, 2008

Facing a firing line of questions from Washington lawmakers, Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman once considered the infallible maestro of the financial system, admitted on Thursday that he "made a mistake" in trusting that free markets could regulate themselves without government oversight.

......................

"I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms," Greenspan said.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/23/business/24greenspan.php

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Горната статия е интересна, защото повдига въпроси в няколко посоки - част от които се засягат и в статията в Икономист:

- В каква степен свободният пазар трябва и може да е "свободен" - т.е. нерегулиран?

- Доколко е погрешно разбирането, че "the self-interests of organizations, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms", според което организациите се разглеждат като хомогенни, рационални единици, където стратегията, корпоративните практики, бизнес процеси и решения се вземат на базата на стриктни правила и изисквания, с цел увеличаването на стойността на тези организации. Както добре е описано в статията в Икономист, в реалността огромната част от стратегическите и тактически решения на фирмите се вземат от хора, имащи цели и интереси, несъвпадащи с тези на фирмата. Това се демонстрира отлично точно в случая с т.нар. subprime mortgages, което доведе до масовата финансова криза...

Лаик Пон 27 Окт 2008, 10:02

добре че поне на родна почва здравите сили надигат глава

http://www.accounterbg.com/upload/documents/Priturka2007_22_br.pdf

стр.8 в bold alien

Лаик Пон 27 Окт 2008, 10:39

INFLATE OR DIE

To get a good understanding of the current problems, you have to go all the way back to the origin of our present monetary system. Imagine a minor economy such as Singapore's but without any foreign trade. When the economies were still in a highly primitive state, way back in the past, goods were simply exchanged for goods. As more good were produced, this barter system became impracticable. Money was therefore devised as a means of exchange. The only question is how much money should be brought into an economy and into circulation. Let's keep things simple to begin with. Suppose one million goods are produced in Singapore and one million Singapore dollars are brought into circulation. The average price of each item is then one Singapore dollar. People always try to improve themselves so productivity increases and more is automatically produced. At some point, then, not one million but 1.1 million goods are manufactured. If the money supply is kept at one million Singapore dollars, then the average price of goods will drop to 0.9 Singapore dollars. If you want to prevent this, then the money supply also has to be increased by 10%. If an error is made here and the money supply is increased by not 10% but 20% then something quite different happens. The average price per item does not fall from one Singapore dollar to 0.9 Singapore dollars; it rises to around 1.1 Singapore dollars. In other words, if the money supply is allowed to increase by less than the total production, then average prices fall and if the money supply is allowed to rise more quickly, then prices rise.
It was soon realised that economies functioned best when prices remained constant. Only then do you achieve the most efficient allocation possible of scarce commodities. This is why the gold standard was introduced. Experience had shown that, over the course of time, gold kept a reasonably constant value. The gold price was set in the 1930s at 35 dollars an ounce. The central banks therefore guaranteed to buy and sell unlimited quantities of gold at that price. Now, suppose that the money supply increased by too much for some reason and prices rose. Then the gold price rose, too. The central bank sold unlimited quantities of gold at 35 dollars, however. This meant that if gold became worth more than 35 dollars, everyone went to buy it from the central bank. This had to be paid for with money, though. Money that came from the economy and found its way to the central bank through gold sales and was therefore removed from circulation (money paid into the central bank is not part of the money supply). That way, the amount of money in circulation diminished automatically. If the money supply shrank too far, then prices started falling everywhere. Gold prices therefore fell below 35 dollars and everyone started selling gold to the central bank. The central bank paid with dollars, so more dollars ended up in the economy. In other words the stable value of gold created a gold standard system that ensured there was just sufficient money in circulation in the economy to keep average prices constant.
Later in the 20th century, however, an enormous problem arose when the amount of goods increased far more rapidly than the amount of gold. So the gold standard was abolished. Originally, this was replaced by a system where, if the economy grew by 5% gross, an attempt was made to increase the money supply by 5%, too. This became impossible in the 1980s, however; as a result of liberalisation of the money markets, it was no longer possible to measure the amount of money in circulation properly. Greenspan – who had just been appointed at the time – therefore came up with his doctrine. The central bank should continue pumping extra money into the economy until inflation threatened to rise. After all, in the 1960s and 1970s the precursors of rising inflation had been clearly identified. Greenspan therefore introduced a system where a sharp eye was kept on such precursors. It would then actually be possible to prevent rising inflation in time.
minting coins and printing banknotes. These days, however, that only represents a few percent of the total money supply in circulation. The vast majority of money is in bank accounts. This is not physical money, but money in account. This is important: what do banks do with money in account? They re-lend it. Someone then receives this money and does something with it. Something is bought with it, in other words. The seller receives this money, most of which ends up back in the banking system, and so forth. In other words, one dollar in the bank multiplies itself increasingly. Not indefinitely, though, as a bank that raises money has to deposit part of it with the central bank as a reserve. In other words, of one dollar in the bank, roughly 0.9 dollars end up in another bank. Then 0.81 dollars end up at the next bank and so forth. This is the contemporary way of regulating the money supply: The central bank can raise or lower the percentage per dollar that a bank has to retain at the central bank as a reserve and the central bank can raise and lower interest rates (we won't go into how this works technically here). If it raises interest rates, saving increases and borrowing decreases and a dollar in the bank then multiplies itself less. Exactly the opposite happens with lower interest rates. It is through the level of interest rate that the money supply is primarily regulated nowadays.
Now back to the Greenspan doctrine. In practice, pumping money into the economy until the precursors of inflation appear therefore means lowering interest rates until that happens. As fate would have it, however, when Greenspan introduced his new method, a number of consecutive developments occurred that suppressed inflation considerably:

• Supply side economics was introduced. This meant strongly stimulating the supply side rather than the demand side of the economy.

• Liberalisation of all kinds of markets that had previously been highly regulated. Prices that had been kept artificially high therefore dropped considerably.

• An electronics revolution (computers, Internet, etc.), which meant far more could be produced per employee.

• Globalisation and the fall of communism, making it possible to combine modern production methods and resources with cheap labour in Asia and other emerging countries. Not for the local market, but to produce for export to the West and Japan.

The last two factors also created a worldwide labour surplus, curbing wage rises even further. This all happened so quickly that inflation dropped increasingly and even threatened to turn into deflation in 1997. Deflation is a disaster for modern economies, however. To begin with, it becomes increasingly advantageous for everyone to delay purchases (prices fall while you wait). More importantly, incomes then fall, making it increasingly difficult to fulfil interest and repayment obligations for old loans, which are fixed. Greenspan therefore swiftly lowered interest rates to avoid this. It was ‘inflate or die’. Normally, this would result in more borrowing and less saving. And that is what happened. Demand would then, generally increase to such an extent that it would prevent deflation and inflation would rise again. As soon as this became apparent, interest rates could be raised again, to halt the growth in the number of loans. This time, however, inflation did not react at all. Greenspan lowered interest rates, borrowing increased and saving decreased, boosting the demand for goods and services, but inflation failed to rise. The supply of goods from Asia, in particular, increased at least as quickly. Greenspan therefore had to keep interest rates low for increased borrowing and decreased saving to continue. Otherwise, deflation would occur. After the fall in stock prices in 2000, in particular, though, many Americans felt they had borrowed enough. Greenspan therefore had to devise a trick for getting them borrowing more again. This he did as follows: He made sure the money supply continued growing far more quickly than the economy. This would generally have increased the consumer price index. Due to the surplus supply of goods and labour, however, this remained low. The money therefore flowed primarily to the asset markets, pushing up prices there. This applied to the property market in particular. Private individuals then started borrowing increasingly against rising housing prices. Banks added to this by lending money to one another increasingly easily.
There had to be one snag, however. Inflation refused to rise; there was even the occasional threat of deflation due to increasing imports from the emerging industrial countries, China in particular. The US therefore had an increasing trade balance deficit and the Asian countries an increasing money surplus. The dollar should then have fallen automatically and Asian currencies appreciated. Asian imports would then have automatically become more expensive and inflation would have automatically risen. That didn't happen, either, as the Asian countries kept their currencies pegged to the dollar.
Conclusion
In retrospect, it is clear that housing and other asset prices were artificially pushed up far too far under Greenspan, with an excessively large debt mountain built up on that basis (we and others warned about this from the start). Greenspan could therefore be accused of having focused too closely on the consumer price index with too little attention to the artificial rise in housing prices and the creation of a debt mountain. His response would probably be that, if that had not happened, deflation would have occurred and a crisis would have broken out immediately. At least as important, however, was that Asian currencies remained pegged to the dollar instead of rising. The currency policy is not determined by the Fed, however, but by the government. In other words, the US (and Chinese) governments are at least equally to blame. Unfortunately, none of this is taken into account when people now talk about setting up a new monetary system to prevent a recurrence of the current crisis. These were conscious choices at the time. And so, probably, was China's policy of keeping their currency pegged to the dollar. This was seen as a good way of opening up China according to the Western model. Moreover, the damage appeared to be limited, as the Chinese had to continually buy dollars with yuans to keep their currency stable. The majority of those dollars then had to be invested in the US. This kept US interest rates low. That it also helped increase the debt mountain even further was something that could be put up with.

(free_willy) Вто 09 Дек 2008, 13:49

WSJ статия относно новите мерки на Обама по отношение на кризата. Все повече се убеждавам че на FIFO принцип Щатите първи ще се измъкнат от рецесията....

Being Santa Claus is fun. Delivering the credit-card bills later is much less fun.

And so it will be for U.S. President-elect Barack Obama. He will get to play Santa Claus at the outset of his term, telling people they can spend hundreds of billions of dollars in the name of stimulus. Later, of course, he'll have to play Scrooge, telling the country that the bill has come due.

The challenge for the Obama team is making sure Americans in general, and Congress in particular, remember that both roles lie ahead for the new president. The task, in the words of one senior Obama aide, is to make sure that people don't think the model for stimulus spending in coming months is "backing in the Brink's truck and opening up the door."

Obama Showing Concern About the Deficit
2:46
As the government looks to stimulate the economy, President-elect Barack Obama is sending signals that he's keeping an eye on the mounting deficit. WSJ's Jerry Seib explains. (Dec. Cool

More broadly, Mr. Obama's team needs to figure out whether there are steps it can take at the outset to build its credibility on fighting deficits in the long run, even as it accepts them in the short run. Such measures are possible and would help calm financial markets as red ink spreads.

If you listened closely to Mr. Obama over the weekend, you could hear him warning people that big spending to stimulate the economy -- and "big" now means a stimulus package something in the order of $500 billion by most estimates -- shouldn't mean mindless spending.

First, the stimulus message: The need for a big economic jolt means "we can't worry short term about the deficit," Mr. Obama said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "We've got to make sure that the economic stimulus plan is large enough to get the economy moving."

Then, the cold-water message: "We are not going to simply write a bunch of checks and let them be spent without some very clear criteria as to how this money is going to benefit the overall economy and put people back to work," the president-elect told reporters. The new administration's plans will be based on what is "going to make the biggest difference in the economy and what will have some long-term benefits."

In other words, if the country is going to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on economic stimulus, it should have something to show for it when the crisis ends. Hence Mr. Obama's emphasis over the weekend on spending on "infrastructure" -- build roads, modernize schools, expand Internet access, improve buildings' energy efficiency, put better technology in hospitals.

That's an attempt to frame how money will be spent. But how do you show seriousness about the budget deficit amid that spending?

Right now, the twin towers of stock-market declines and job losses have produced a remarkable bipartisan consensus that this simply isn't a time to worry about the deficit. As a result, Mr. Obama has the closest thing anyone in his job ever gets to a blank check. He thus has been given an enormous opportunity to shape the nation's priorities at the very outset of a presidential term, one probably matched only by the opening Franklin Roosevelt had in taking office in the depths of the Depression.

Associated Press
The need for a big economic jolt means "we can't worry short term about the deficit," Mr. Obama said on NBC's "Meet the Press."
In fact, this opportunity is very much shaped by the experience of the pre-Roosevelt Depression years, when, some economists believe, stinginess in monetary policy and a failure to target government spending more effectively had disastrous results.

So the Obama team believes that for the next 18 months or so, it would be a mistake to let deficit concerns steer government fiscal policy. In that period, the deficit will rise to levels that once would have seemed alarming. The $455 billion deficit for the fiscal year that ended Oct. 1 already is the largest on record in dollar terms. As a percentage of gross domestic product, though, it amounts to 3.2%, less than at the peak of the 1980s downturn.

But the deficit will be a lot worse next year, likely reaching between $750 billion and $1 trillion, depending on how costs of the financial-sector bailout are accounted for. The only real question is whether the deficit, as a percentage of GDP, cracks the postwar record of 6% set in 1983. If the red ink hits $900 billion or so, it will.

The Obama team's best guess is that, though stimulus spending will be spread over the first two years of the new president's term, the deficit will hit the high-water mark in the first year, with economic improvements in 2010 generating government revenue that starts to gradually bring it back down. If the Obama team gets lucky, and the government can start selling at a profit some of the assets it's buying up to rescue the financial system, the decline could be faster after that.

But counting on luck alone won't be sufficient. Wide deficits risk pushing up interest rates, interfering with the economic recovery down the road.

One possibility: The Obama team and its Democratic allies in Congress could resolve to work into their initial economic package some long-term deficit-reduction measures that automatically kick in later, ensuring spending cuts or revenue increases as the economy recovers. That would help give the new team credibility on the deficit, even if everyone else in Washington agrees to ignore it for now.

Write to Gerald F. Seib at jerry.seib@wsj.com

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